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INTRODUCTION
In April 2018, police officers arrested Joseph James DeAngelo.1
DeAngelo, the officers claimed, was the “Golden State Killer,” a man
who committed dozens of murders and over fifty sexual assaults in
California in the 1970s and 1980s.2 The Golden State Killer had
long eluded police, even though his DNA profile linked him to doz-
ens of violent crimes.3 While law enforcement officials from several
jurisdictions in California had collected his DNA from crime scenes,
the Golden State Killer’s crimes predated modern DNA analysis.4
Police found little use for the profile without a suspect’s profile to
compare to it.5
Nearly forty years later, the break in the case that ultimately
implicated DeAngelo came when officers ran the Golden State
Killer’s DNA profile through an online genealogical DNA database,
GEDMatch, and located a familial match—one of DeAngelo’s third
cousins.6 Police traced DeAngelo through his family tree, eventu-
ally narrowing in on DeAngelo specifically.7 Police then obtained
DeAngelo’s actual DNA sample by search warrant, and confirmed
that DeAngelo and the Golden State Killer are one and the same.8
DeAngelo’s apprehension and subsequent examples of police
using similar tactics to solve cold cases—including the NorCal
Rapist9—spurred a national debate on DNA and privacy.10 Direct-to-
1. Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer Is Tracked Through a Thick-
et of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html [https://perma.cc/EW8R-VU6U].
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See Yaniv Erlich et al., Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range Familial
Searches, 362 SCI. 690, 690 (2018), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/early/ 2018/10/
10/science.aau4832.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3LT-65DA].
7. Id.
8. See Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1.
9. See, e.g., Phil Helsel, Police Use DNA to Arrest ‘NorCal Rapist’ Suspect in Crimes That
Spanned 15 Years, NBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2018, 9:50 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/police-use-dna-arrest-norcal-rapist-suspect-crimes-spanned-15-n912266 [https://perma.
cc/JD57-M4LY].
10. See, e.g., Tina Hesman Saey, New Genetic Sleuthing Tools Helped Track Down the
Golden State Killer Suspect: Mining Genealogy Databases to Find Crime Suspects Raises Pri-
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consumer DNA services, such as 23andMe and AncestryDNA, have
dramatically expanded in recent years.11 Over seven million at-home
DNA kits were sold in 2017 alone.12 As of April 2018, more than
fifteen million people have undergone direct-to-consumer DNA test-
ing.13 Some scientists predict that 60 percent of Americans of Eu-
ropean descent have a familial match as close as a third cousin in
a commercial DNA database.14
Based on these statistics and the recent success tracking down
the Golden State Killer and NorCal Rapist, police will likely see
third-party DNA and ancestry databases as a valuable resource to
assist in closing cold cases.15 Law enforcement agencies across the
country have thousands of unsolved cases involving DNA with no
suspect profile to conduct a comparison.16 But what are the Fourth
Amendment implications of passing a perpetrator’s DNA profile
vacy Concerns, SCI. NEWS (Apr. 29, 2018, 9:49 AM), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/
golden-state-killer-suspect-dna-genetics-genealogy [https://perma.cc/2K93-FJ25]; Susan
Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means for Your Genetic Privacy, CNN (May 1, 2018,
12:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/27/health/golden-state-killer-genetic-privacy/index.
html [https://perma.cc/A6LJ-DMZU]. In response to widespread media coverage of the Golden
State Killer arrest, companies such as 23andMe published privacy statements reassuring us-
ers that their DNA information and data will not be released “without [the customer’s] explicit
consent.” Privacy, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/LRY3-SJ
2Z]. However, 23andMe’s website also states that information could be released if police
present “a valid court order [or] subpoena.” Privacy Highlights, 23ANDME, https://23andme.
com/about/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/26QP-QNSF].
11. 23andMe was founded in 2006 and has over ten million customers. About Us,
23ANDME, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/9S2E-GY
7U].
12. See Erlich et al., supra note 6.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Reports indicate that FamilyTreeDNA, another direct-to-consumer DNA service, is
allowing the FBI access to its two million genetic profiles on a case-by-case basis. See Kristen
V. Brown, A Major DNA-Testing Company Is Sharing Some of Its Data with the FBI. Here’s
Where It Draws the Line, FORTUNE (Feb. 1, 2019), http://fortune.com/2019/02/01/genetic-test
ing-consumer-dna-familytreedna-fbi/ [https://perma.cc/K82K-2MCN]; see also Eric Levenson
& Artemis Moshtaghian, This Cold Case Is the First Genetic Genealogy Arrest To Go to Trial,
CNN (June 12, 2019, 2:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/12/us/cold-case-genetic-gene
alogy-washington/index.html [https://perma.cc/4RXB-WJCY] (discussing the recent conviction
of William Earl Talbott II who police identified after running his DNA through an open source
DNA database).
16. For an interactive map of open homicide cases in cities nationwide, see Wesley Lowery
et al., Where Killings Go Unsolved, WASH. POST (June 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/graphics/2018/investigations/where-murders-go-unsolved/ [https://perma.cc/4UJ7-EJCJ].
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through an ancestry database or compelling a third-party company
to do so? Is such a process considered a search or does it otherwise
implicate an expectation of privacy sufficient to trigger the war-
rant requirement of the Fourth Amendment? If this process con-
stitutes a search, could an individual challenge the search of a
family member’s DNA profile if it eventually implicates them? This
Note will address these questions.
In Part I, this Note will provide an overview of DNA and its use
in criminal investigations and prosecutions. Part II will survey both
the Supreme Court’s third-party doctrine, including the Court’s
recent decision Carpenter v. United States, and the evolution of the
Fourth Amendment “standing” doctrine.17 Part III will compare
DNA and cell-site location information, which the Court analyzed
in Carpenter, concluding that individuals have an expectation of
privacy in their own DNA profile even when shared with a third
party. In Part IV, this Note will push the concept of standing,
arguing that the nature of DNA—specifically the interconnected-
ness of DNA among family members—should allow a related in-
dividual to challenge the legality of a search of his familial DNA.
Part V will address counterarguments.
I. DNA AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Today, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis occupies an indis-
pensable place in the criminal justice system—connecting suspects
to the DNA they leave behind at crime scenes. Police in the United
States first utilized DNA analysis in 1986.18 Since that time, law
enforcement officials have regularly relied on matching a suspect’s
17. While the Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois purported to do away with separate
standing inquiry, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978), Justices on the Supreme Court and lower courts
regularly use the term “standing.” See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85-97 (1980);
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 738 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v.
Kember, 648 F.2d 1354, 1365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This Note will utilize the term “standing”
as well.
18. See KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 21
(1997). Before law enforcement agencies possessed the technology to analyze DNA, they often
resorted to blood typing. Id. at 6-7. Beginning in the early 1970s, scientists could determine
if a suspect’s blood sample was of the same blood type as the one found at the crime scene. Id.
at 7. Blood typing could help police eliminate suspects. See id. at 7-8. However, blood typing
lacked the level of individual specificity of later DNA analysis. See id.
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DNA profile to a DNA sample.19 Courts have responded to the per-
vasive DNA collection and use as evidence, laying some ground-
work for consideration of DNA under the Fourth Amendment.20
A. Basics of DNA and DNA Fingerprinting
Almost all human cells contain, in their nuclei, forty-six chro-
mosomes made up of DNA.21 Individuals inherit one half of their
chromosomes from each of their parents.22 DNA is made up of in-
dividual molecules known as nucleotides.23 Four types of nucleo-
tides—adenine (A), thymine (T), guanine (G), and cytosine (C)—in
sequence form one half of a strand of DNA.24 The DNA sequence
matches up with a complementary sequence to form a DNA strand.25
When matching up nucleotides, A always pairs with T, and G
always pairs with C.26 These couplings are known as “base pairs.”27
Base pairs form the basic structure of DNA, known as the “double
helix.”28
For genetic identification purposes, analysts look to identifiable
patterns in the genetic code, known as short tandem repeats
(STRs).29 Individual STRs, averaging between two to five base pairs,
form a sequence which repeats a set number of times.30 STRs occupy
19. See id. at 21. The popular portrayal of DNA’s use in television and movies may con-
tribute to “the CSI effect”—the trend that juries expect prosecutors to present DNA evidence
at any criminal trial. See generally Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, CSI and Its Effects:
Media, Juries, and the Burden of Proof, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 435 (2007); Kimberlianne
Podlas, “The C.S.I. Effect”: Exposing the Media Myth, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 429 (2006). 
20. See infra Part I.B.
21. See Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch
Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 249 (2006).
22. Id.
23. Nucleotides and Bases, GENETICS GENERATION, http://knowgenetics.org/nucleotides-
and-bases/ [https://perma.cc/F5W5-PSWF].
24. HENRY C. LEE & FRANK TIRNADY, BLOOD EVIDENCE: HOW DNA IS REVOLUTIONIZING
THE WAY WE SOLVE CRIMES 3 (2003).
25. Id. at 3-4.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Greely et al., supra note 21, at 249.
29. See id. at 250.
30. LEE & TIRNADY, supra note 24, at 6.
292 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:287
a fixed point on a chromosome.31 By looking at the location of the
STRs on the chromosome32 and the number of repetitions, analysts
can compare one DNA sample to another.33
In order to compare DNA samples—a process called DNA finger-
printing—crime laboratories in the United States look to a set of
twenty STRs.34 The twenty STRs are known as “CODIS core loci,”
after the Combined DNA Index System, the FBI’s national DNA
database.35 Although STRs vary significantly between individuals,
they are not unique in and of themselves.36 However, when the
twenty loci are analyzed together, the profile is unique when com-
pared to other full profiles.37
Once analysts identify the twenty markers, they compare them
to other profiles to see how closely they match.38 On average, two
unrelated people will share, at most, two or three markers.39 First
degree relatives share, on average, about half of the twenty pairs.40
By comparing all twenty markers, the probability of a false positive
is very small.41 An exact match indicates that the two samples came
from the same individual.42 A partial match indicates a familial
connection.43
Commercial DNA companies, rather than looking just at the
twenty STR markers, conduct different forms of analysis44 that
31. Greely et al., supra note 21, at 250.
32. Each location tested is known as a locus (plural: loci).
33. Id.
34. See id. In 2017, the FBI added seven new markers to the original thirteen CODIS loci.
Criminal Justice Info. Servs., Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU INVES-
TIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis [https://perma.cc/
8ZFH-68B4].
35. See id. For additional information about the CODIS database, see infra Part I.C.
36. See Greely et al., supra note 21, at 251.
37. See id. at 250.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 250. Identical twins would also be an exact match. See id.
43. See id.
44. For a description of the differences between different types of genetic testing, see
What’s the Difference Between Genetic Testing Technologies?, VERITAS (July 30, 2018),
https://www.veritasgenetics.com/whats-difference-between-genetic-testing-technologies
[https://perma.cc/THU9-V6JY]; see also What Are Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs)?,
NAT’L INST. HEALTH (June 25, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/snp
[https://perma.cc/QN3J-D78U].
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expose substantially more information. For example, AncestryDNA
states that it uses “microarray-based autosomal DNA testing” to
analyze over 700,000 locations of a person’s genome.45 Such analysis
provides customers with genetic, ancestry, and medical information.
Courts have not yet grappled with how this vast increase in access
to information should interact with the Fourth Amendment.
B. How the Courts Have Treated DNA Under the Fourth
Amendment
Most court decisions on DNA searches have concerned law en-
forcement collection of DNA from convicts, arrestees, and others in
the presence of police. The Supreme Court weighed in on the issue
of preconviction DNA collection in Maryland v. King.46 The Mary-
land DNA Collection Act allowed law enforcement to take a cheek
swab DNA sample from any “individual who is charged with ... a
crime of violence or an attempt to commit a crime of violence; or ...
burglary or an attempt to commit burglary.”47 After arresting King
for assault, police took his DNA and uploaded it to their database.48
King’s DNA profile matched to DNA gathered from a six-year-old
rape case, for which King was later convicted.49 The Court held that
the Fourth Amendment allowed police to collect DNA by cheek swab
from a person arrested for a “serious offense.”50 The police’s actions
were reasonable, according to the King Court, because the govern-
ment interest in identifying an arrestee outweighed the minimal
intrusion to the individual.51
Maryland is not the only state that allows DNA collection from
arrestees.52 California, Texas, Virginia, and Louisiana are among
states that require preconviction DNA collection from individuals
45. Frequently Asked Questions, ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/en/legal/
us/faq#about-3 [https://perma.cc/C264-RC9G].
46. 569 U.S. 435, 442 (2013).
47. Id. at 443 (quoting MD. CODE. ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2011)).
48. Id. at 441.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 465.
51. Id. at 446.
52. See Greely et al., supra note 21, at 250.
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charged with felonies.53 Lower courts have also wrestled with the
scope of permissible DNA searches under the Fourth Amendment.54
C. CODIS and the Rise of Consumer DNA Databases
In 1990, the Federal Bureau of Investigation piloted CODIS to
assist federal and state law enforcement agencies in solving violent
crimes.55 The DNA Identification Act of 1994 solidified the CODIS
project by establishing the National DNA Index System to match
DNA profiles to known offenders.56 When law enforcement enters a
DNA profile into the CODIS database, searches can return a full
match or a partial match.57 A perfect match indicates that the DNA
sample came from the offender listed in CODIS.58 A partial match,
however, indicates that the crime scene DNA originated from a
family member of that offender.59
In addition to law enforcement databases, third-party consumer
databases hold growing numbers of DNA profiles. As of April 2018,
more than fifteen million people had undergone direct-to-consumer
DNA testing.60 Some scientists already predict that 60 percent of
searches for individuals of European descent will result in the
match of a third cousin—the same level of connection in the Golden
State Killer case.61 With the popularity of direct-to-consumer DNA
services—over seven million at-home DNA kits were sold in 2017
53. Id. Federal law also authorizes the Attorney General to collect DNA samples from
individuals who are arrested or detained under the authority of the United States. See
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-162, § 1004(a)(1)(A), 119 Stat. 2960, 3085.
54. See United States v. Thomas, 736 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that grand jury
violated defendant’s rights when it subpoenaed defendant’s DNA without probable cause).
Compare United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 239 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that extraction of
DNA from a defendant’s clothing constituted a search), with Commonwealth v. Arzola, 26
N.E.3d 185, 194 (Mass. 2015) (finding that police extracting DNA from defendant’s shirt was
not a search), and Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 767 (Md. 2014) (finding that DNA testing
sample defendant left on chair in police station was not a search).
55. Criminal Justice Info. Servs., supra note 34.
56. See id.
57. Greely et al., supra note 21, at 251.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See Erlich et al., supra note 6, at 690.
61. Id.
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alone62—and the vast amount of knowledge contained within com-
mercially analyzed DNA samples,63 it is only a matter of time before
any person in the United States can be identified through a familial
search of a third-party DNA database. Courts will soon need to ad-
dress the question of whether a familial DNA search in a third-party
database intrudes on a family member’s expectation of privacy and
should therefore require a warrant.
II. THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE, CARPENTER, AND STANDING
While courts have not yet faced these exact facts, the Supreme
Court has considered an individual’s privacy interests in informa-
tion shared with third parties, and when the police can collect DNA
samples. This Part provides an overview of relevant case law.
Section A discusses the basics of the Fourth Amendment and the
Court’s third-party doctrine jurisprudence. Section B analyzes the
recent decision in Carpenter v. United States. Finally, Section C
details the Court’s standing doctrine.
A. Third-Party Doctrine Before Carpenter
The Fourth Amendment bars the government from committing
“unreasonable searches and seizures” and requires a warrant, or at
a minimum probable cause to support such a search or seizure.64
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the foundation of
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.65 Therefore, if a search
is “reasonable,” it is constitutionally permissible.66
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
64. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65. See, e.g., Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 298 (2014); Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
66. See Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 298; Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403.
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The modern test for constitutionally permissible searches stems
from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States.67 In
interpreting the majority’s holding, Justice Harlan envisioned a
“twofold requirement” for Fourth Amendment reasonableness.68
First, under the subjective requirement, the individual must have
an actual expectation of privacy.69 Second, under the objective re-
quirement, that expectation of privacy must “be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”70 If an individual can meet
both the subjective and objective elements, he has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.71 When the government violates a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, then it has violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.72
The reasonable expectation of privacy calculus, however, is turn-
ed on its head when third parties are involved. In United States v.
Miller—largely considered the beginning of the “third-party
doctrine”—the Court held that Miller had “no protectable Fourth
Amendment interest” in documents the government subpoenaed
from his bank while investigating him for tax evasion.73 The Court
later stated that an individual has “no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,”74
even if the individual conveys that information expecting it to be
used for a specific, limited purpose.75 The third-party doctrine rests
on the assumption that in providing information to a third party,
an individual considered the increased likelihood that the third
party may, intentionally or otherwise, share that information.76
Therefore, in making the decision to provide information to a third
party, the individual assumed this additional risk.77
Many scholars have criticized the third-party doctrine as being
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment generally, and the Court’s
67. See 389 U.S. 347, 361-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
68. Id. at 361.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. 425 U.S. 435, 436-37 (1976).
74. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
75. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
76. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
77. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
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holding in Katz specifically.78 This Note does not take up this argu-
ment. The Court has repeatedly affirmed the third-party doctrine,
entrenching it in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.79 Instead, this
Note considers the Supreme Court’s latest examination of the third-
party doctrine, articulated in Carpenter v. United States.80 It then
applies the Carpenter Court’s analysis to DNA held in third-party
databases.81
B. Carpenter v. United States and Cell-Site Location Information
In Carpenter v. United States, the Court considered whether the
practice of obtaining cell-site location information (CSLI) from a
third-party company was a Fourth Amendment search.82 The defen-
dant in Carpenter was convicted of multiple counts of robbery and
carrying a weapon in commission of a federal crime of violence in
connection with the series of robberies.83 After a tip from a co-con-
spirator, investigators obtained a court order for Carpenter’s cell
phone records—including his CSLI—pursuant to a provision in the
Stored Communications Act.84 Under the Act, the government can
force communications companies, such as cell phone providers, to
disclose telecommunication records after receiving a court order.85
Unlike a search warrant, which mandates probable cause, the Act
only requires the government to have “reasonable grounds to be-
lieve” that the records contain information relevant to an ongoing
78. See, e.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.7(b)-(c) (5th ed. 2012); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth
Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 975, 976-77 (2007) (articulating how and when individuals have an expectation
of privacy to information, regardless of whether it is held by third parties); Arnold H. Loewy,
The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1230-
31 (1983) (arguing that the problem with the third-party doctrine is that it focuses on guilty
individuals rather than presuming innocence). But see, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564-66 (2009) (highlighting two critical functions
of the third-party doctrine: maintaining the “technological neutrality” of the Fourth Amend-
ment and ensuring clarity in Fourth Amendment application).
79. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 745; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
80. See infra Part II.B.
81. See infra Part III. 
82. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
83. See id. at 2212.
84. See id.
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)-(d) (2012); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
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investigation.86 In holding that this practice constituted a search,
the Court evaluated both the Court’s previous recognition of privacy
in an individual’s location information and its third-party doctrine
jurisprudence.87
1. Privacy Interest in Location Information
The Court began its discussion by reaffirming a person’s expec-
tation of privacy in his physical location.88 That privacy expectation,
the majority posited, related both to the voluntariness of the trans-
mission of location information and the degree of thoroughness of
police surveillance.89
The Carpenter Court referenced its decision in United States v.
Knotts, where it held that a beeper placed within a container
purchased by the defendant’s co-conspirator and used to track the
co-conspirator’s vehicle was not a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment.90 In applying Justice Harlan’s test from his concurrence in
Katz v. United States,91 the Court found that a person did not have
an objective, justifiable expectation of privacy to his location when
“traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares.”92 By traveling
in public, the person was voluntarily conveying his movements and
location to anyone who might want to look.93 As a result, the beeper,
the Court reasoned, provided law enforcement with no more infor-
mation regarding Knotts’s movements than traditional police sur-
veillance.94 The Carpenter Court noted, however, that the Knotts
decision drew the line at traditional, “rudimentary” police surveil-
lance.95 The Knotts decision did not apply to more far-reaching
methods, such as “twenty-four hour surveillance.”96
86. § 2703(d).
87. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214-17.
88. See id. at 2217.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 2215; see also 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
91. See 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
92. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
93. See id. at 281-82.
94. See id. at 282.
95. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215.
96. See id.
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The Carpenter Court also discussed the decision in United States
v. Jones, in which the Court considered the constitutionality of mon-
itoring the location of an individual through a GPS tracking device
illegally attached to his car.97 While the Jones Court decided that
the practice was unconstitutional on other grounds,98 the Carpenter
Court noted that five Justices were concerned about the means,
length, and scope of GPS tracking by law enforcement.99 In his con-
currence in Jones, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan,
Justice Alito stated that, in an age where individuals carry cell
phones and drive cars equipped with GPS devices, society’s ex-
pectation of privacy might be evolving.100 Additionally, Justice Alito
discussed concerns about the length of location monitoring, stating
that tracking “every single movement of [Jones’s] car for a very long
period” would constitute a search.101 Justice Sotomayor agreed with
Justice Alito’s assessments regarding evolving expectations of pri-
vacy and long-term GPS monitoring.102 Among the Carpenter Court’s
fundamental concerns about warrantless access to CSLI was the
scope of access to personal information, particularly the accuracy
and length of surveillance information police could acquire from
CSLI.103
97. See id.; 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
98. The Jones Court based its decision on the idea that officers had committed a trespass
against the defendant when placing a GPS tracker on his car. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404, 410.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, harkened back to Olmstead v. United States, stating that
trespass still formed a separate ground for Fourth Amendment protection. Id. at 405. Five
Justices, while concurring, disagreed with Justice Scalia’s rationale. Id. at 413-14.
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing that the action was “a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment” but noting that “the Fourth Amendment is not only concerned with
trespassory intrusions on property”); id. at 419 (Alito, J. concurring in judgment) (stating that
the Court’s holding was “unwise,” “strains the language of the Fourth Amendment,” “has little
if any support in current Fourth Amendment case law,” and was “highly artificial”). Because
the Jones majority’s rationale differed from established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
the decision has narrow application.
99. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215.
100. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 430.
102. See id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
103. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-19.
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2. Third-Party Doctrine
The Carpenter Court then considered how the third-party doc-
trine applied to CSLI. The Court first discussed Miller, recounting
that Miller’s checks were not confidential documents and were used
for commercial purposes:104 “Miller had ‘take[n] the risk, in reveal-
ing his affairs to another, that the information [would] be conveyed
by that person to the Government.’”105 The defendant in Smith like-
wise maintained little expectation of privacy in the phone numbers
he dialed.106 Therefore, the government’s collection of those records
did not constitute a search.107 Further, both Smith and Miller had
voluntarily conveyed this information to the third party.108 In
choosing to provide the information to a third party, Smith and
Miller “assumed the risk” that the records would be shared.109
3. Expectation of Privacy & Third-Party Doctrine: The Court’s
Application in Carpenter
Despite these precedents, the Court did not extend the third-
party doctrine to CSLI, finding that “an individual maintains a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his physical movements as cap-
tured through CSLI.”110 Therefore, police acquisition of CSLI con-
stituted a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.111
The Court first applied the Katz formulation, considering both
subjective and objective expectations of privacy.112 Citing Jones, the
Court reasoned that society presumed that law enforcement offi-
cials could not “secretly monitor and catalogue” all of an individual’s
movements “for a very long period.”113 Procurement of CSLI directly
violated this societal expectation.114
104. See id. at 2216.
105. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2217.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 2217-19.
113. Id. at 2217 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012)).
114. See id.
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In evaluating Carpenter’s individual expectation of privacy, the
Court further emphasized that time-stamped GPS data provided
law enforcement access to deeply personal information about an
individual’s life.115 Because everyone carries a cell phone, the gov-
ernment could access “near[ly] perfect surveillance” on almost any
individual.116 Further, by looking at historical CSLI, the government
could virtually retrace a person’s steps going back years.117 The
Court also noted the increasing capabilities of CSLI.118 While CSLI
technology may currently be “less precise than GPS information,” it
has become increasingly accurate.119 Because “more sophisticated
systems” were in development, the Court opted to adopt a rule
which would cover these future advancements.120 Therefore, both
the present scope of CSLI and the future projected capability of
similar technology constituted a level of intrusion into Carpenter’s
physical movements that he reasonably expected would remain
private from the government.121
The Court distinguished CSLI from other information turned
over to third parties both in terms of its scope and the voluntari-
ness of its transfer.122 In both Smith and Miller, constraints were
present to limit the government’s access to the individual’s infor-
mation.123 CSLI, by contrast, had “no comparable limitations.”124
115. See id. (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). In Jones, Justice
Sotomayor explained how GPS tracking could generate a detailed description of an individual,
allowing police access to a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.” 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The Carpenter Court expressed
concern with exactly this comprehensive intrusion into a person’s private life. See Carpenter,
138 S. Ct. at 2217-18.
116. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 2219.
119. See id. at 2218.
120. See id. at 2218-19 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)).
121. See id. at 2219.
122. See id. at 2217-18.
123. See id. at 2219. In Smith, the pen register contained call logs, thereby revealing
minimal information regarding the caller’s identity. See id.; Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.
2473, 2492 (2014). Likewise, in Miller, the checks were “not confidential communications,”
and only used for “commercial transactions.” United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976);
see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. Neither Miller nor Smith had a reasonable expectation
of privacy to the contents of these documents. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219; Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 437.
124. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
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Access to CSLI thus allowed the government to possess expansive
amounts of deeply personal and revealing information.125
Additionally, CSLI, although transmitted to the cell phone com-
pany, was not voluntarily shared in the same way Miller shared the
checks with his bank or Smith shared his phone number with the
pen register.126 Practically everyone has a cell phone,127 and it is
nearly impossible to use a cell phone in accordance with societal
expectations without constantly transmitting location informa-
tion.128 The average phone user, even if he is aware that he is trans-
mitting location information to his phone company, cannot opt
out.129 Therefore, because Carpenter possessed a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in his physical location and the third-party doctrine
did not apply, “the [g]overnment must generally obtain a warrant
supported by probable cause” in order to acquire his or another in-
dividual’s CSLI.130 This same rationale likely supports an expecta-
tion of privacy in other information held by third parties, including,
as this Note argues, DNA information.131
C. “Standing” Doctrine
In order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge, a party claim-
ing a violation must have “a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy.”132 Any criminal defendant easily meets this require-
ment—he has an interest in avoiding conviction and the resulting
125. See id. at 2217.
126. See id. at 2220.
127. As of February 5, 2018, 95 percent of Americans owned a cellphone and 77 percent of
Americans owned a smart phone. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pew
internet.org/fact-sheet/ mobile/ [https://perma.cc/M3FR-QPUJ].
128. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
129. See id. (“Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to
avoid leaving behind a trail of location data.”).
130. Id. at 2221. Unfortunately for Carpenter, the Court’s conclusion did not benefit him
on remand. After the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the FBI violated Carpenter’s Fourth
Amendment rights when it obtained his CSLI, the court held that it would not exclude the
CSLI data because “the FBI agents relied in good faith on the [Stored Communications Act].”
United States v. Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 314 (6th Cir. 2019). Therefore, Carpenter’s criminal
conviction remained. Id.
131. See infra Part III.
132. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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sentence.133 However, to assert a Fourth Amendment challenge, a
criminal defendant must satisfy another requirement—the chal-
lenged violation must have been a violation of his own rights, rath-
er than the rights of a third party.134
The Supreme Court redefined its view on standing in Rakas v.
Illinois.135 The Court held that in order to challenge an illegal
search, the defendant must have a “legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy” in the area searched.136 Justice Rehnquist stated that the
concept of Fourth Amendment standing was “more properly sub-
sumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine,” rather than
a separate inquiry.137
The process of wrapping standing into a substantive Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy analysis embodied an innovation
for the Court. Prior to Rakas, the Court required a threshold inquiry
into whether an individual had “standing” before asking whether
the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.138 In Rakas, the
Court held that an individual could not challenge the search of a
car in which he was merely a passenger.139 A temporary passenger
in another person’s vehicle did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the areas of the automobile that the police searched,
including the glove compartment and under the passenger’s seat.140
133. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (“There is no necessity to
exclude evidence against one defendant in order to protect the rights of another.”); LAFAVE,
supra note 78, § 11.3.
134. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963) (“The [unlawful] seizure of
this heroin [from co-conspirator Toy] invaded no right of privacy of person or premises which
would entitle Wong Sun to object to its use at his trial.”).
135. 439 U.S. 128, 137-39 (1978).
136. Id. at 148.
137. Id. at 139.
138. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960) (finding that anyone
“legitimately on premises” had automatic standing to challenge a search). While Justice
Rehnquist desired to collapse standing into the substantive Fourth Amendment inquiry,
Justices on the Supreme Court and lower court judges regularly use the term “standing” to
refer to an individual’s ability to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge. See supra note 17.
139. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148.
140. Id. The Court compared petitioner’s legitimate expectation of privacy to other cases
where the Court found standing. Id. at 149. In Jones, the Court held that because Jones was
“legitimately on premises” where the search occurred, he had standing to challenge the
search. 362 U.S. at 267. While the Court abandoned the “legitimately on premises” test in
Rakas, see 439 U.S. at 147, the Rakas Court maintained that Jones had a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy to his friend’s apartment because he had permission to use the apartment,
had a key, kept his possessions at the apartment, had “dominion and control” over the apart-
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Two years later, the Court found that one defendant possessed no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the purse of someone carrying
his narcotics,141 while another had no legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in documents held by his bank officer.142
The Court next considered whether an individual had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in another’s home where he was a guest.143 In
Minnesota v. Olson, the Court held that an overnight guest had “a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home.”144 Such
expectation of privacy does not require the guest to have complete
dominion and control over his host’s home.145 The expectation of
privacy, rather, is based in societal customs and understandings.146
The host has an expectation of privacy in his own home which ex-
tends to his guests.147 While only temporarily permitted on the
premises, the guest in Olson had standing to raise a Fourth Amend
ment challenge.148
Lastly, in Minnesota v. Carter, the Court came to the opposite
conclusion after asking whether guests possessed a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy when they were only on the premises for com-
mercial purposes, for a relatively short time, and otherwise lacked
ment, and could exclude others. Id. at 149. Similarly, the Rakas Court characterized the
defendant in Katz as maintaining a legitimate expectation of privacy when he “shut the door”
to the telephone booth, “exclude[d] all others,” and “paid the toll.” Id. (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)).
141. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980). In Rawlings, the petitioner placed
his narcotics within the purse of his companion, Cox. Id. at 101. Rawlings sought to challenge
the legality of the search of Cox’s purse. Id. at 100, 103. While he owned the narcotics within
the purse, the Court found that Rawlings did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the purse at the time of the search because “he had known [the purse’s owner] for only a few
days” and had no right to exclude others from the purse, had never “received access to [the]
purse” previously, or had Cox’s consent to obtain possession of the purse. Id. at 105. 
142. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980). In Payner, the Court agreed
with the district court’s assessment that a U.S. law enforcement official “‘knowingly and
willfully participated in the unlawful seizure’ of [Payner’s banker’s documents].” Id. at 730
(citing United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 120 (N.D. Ohio 1977)). However, because
the conduct did not “invade[ ] his legitimate expectation of privacy,” Payner did not have
standing to challenge the seizure. Id. at 731-32. 
143. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See id.
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connection to their host.149 The guests in Carter gathered in the
host’s home for the sole purpose of bagging cocaine.150 A police of-
ficer, after peering through the blinds and seeing the illegal activi-
ty, obtained a search warrant.151
Although the plurality found that respondents had no legitimate
expectation of privacy, a majority of the Court’s Justices, both
concurring and dissenting, believed that most house guests would
have standing to challenge such a search.152 Justice Kennedy, in his
concurrence, stated that “almost all social guests have a legitimate
expectation of privacy ... in their host’s home.”153 However, the
specific fact pattern in Carter—particularly respondents’ lack of
connection to the home—drove Justice Kennedy to conclude that
respondents had no legitimate expectation of privacy.154 Likewise,
Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment,155 and all three dissent-
ing Justices, found that respondents had standing to challenge the
search.156
In recent cases, the Court has repeatedly found that an individual
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his own vehicle,157 in an-
other person’s rental car,158 and in his location information held by
a third party.159 In the coming years, the Court will likely consider
technology-augmented searches that implicate privacy interests in
a way that the Rakas Court could not have imagined. As the Court
evaluates these challenges, the Court’s trend toward a more expan-
sive understanding of expectation of privacy may support challenges
149. 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998).
150. Id. at 86.
151. Id. at 85.
152. See id. at 99, 102, 103.
153. Id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 102.
155. Id. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer, while finding that respondents had
standing to challenge the search, determined that the officer committed no constitutional
violation. Id.
156. Id. at 106 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen a homeowner ... personally invites a
guest into her home [for any purpose], that guest should share his host’s shelter against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.”).
157. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405-06 (2012) (finding that real and personal
property can provide a foundation for expectations of privacy).
158. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1524 (2018) (holding that an unauthorized
driver “in otherwise lawful possession and control of a rental car” has standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a search therein).
159. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
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for many defendants—including a defendant challenging a familial
DNA search of a third-party database.
III. DNA AND CSLI
The Carpenter Court cited the “unique nature” of CSLI as the
reason that its collection did not fall under the third-party doc-
trine.160 While the Court considered its decision to be “a narrow
one,”161 the Court’s reasoning concerning both the expectation of
privacy and the third-party doctrine can—and should—be applied
to DNA contained within third-party databases.
A. Expectation of Privacy in DNA
DNA—or more specifically, the DNA profile that stems from a
DNA sample—gains its privacy significance when attached to the
individual.162 Just as the CSLI in Carpenter only provided law
enforcement with actionable information when combined with
Carpenter’s identity, DNA profiles are only useful to law enforce-
ment when they know to whom the DNA belongs.163 Stemming from
the connection to an individual is the expectation of privacy—both
that of the individual and that which society recognizes—in the
collection of DNA samples and the information generated in a DNA
profile. This expectation of privacy in DNA rests on multiple, long-
held understandings: that people possess an expectation of privacy
in their medical information, in confidential information, and in
personally identifiable data, even when shared with third parties.
First, DNA information maintains an expectation of privacy as
medical information. Genetic information has a wide variety of
medical purposes. DNA can indicate an individual’s genetic risk for
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2220 (noting that the Carpenter holding does not apply to “real-time CSLI,”
“tower dumps,” “conventional surveillance techniques,” or foreign intelligence and national
security).
162. Presently, while investigators can determine whether a particular sample of DNA
came from a male or female subject, DNA cannot be tied to an individual without comparing
it to a known sample of that individual’s DNA. See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING:
BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF STR MARKERS 113-15 (2d ed. 2005); supra notes 32-
41 and accompanying text.
163. See BUTLER, supra note 162, at 113-15.
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certain diseases, including Parkinson’s Disease, dementia, or can-
cer.164 DNA can also provide information about paternity of a child
or bring to light other familial connections.165 If an individual sub-
mitted his DNA profile to a third party for medical purposes, say for
a genetic disease test, it is easy to definitively state that the DNA
profile is medical information.
But what about individuals who send their DNA to a third-party
company solely to determine their ancestry?166 Although ancestry
may seem distant from medical uses, a person’s ancestry can have
medical connotations.167 Studies have linked certain haplogroups—
genetic groups who share a common ancestor—to multiple dis-
eases.168 For example, a 2012 study found that British men be-
longing to a particular Y chromosome haplogroup—men who share
a common male ancestor—were at an increased risk of developing
coronary artery disease.169 The study prompted the U.K.’s National
Health Service to publish detailed information about haplogroups
in an effort to educate potentially affected men.170 Information that
provides doctors and patients with resources to make informed
medical decisions should fall directly within the category of medical
164. In 2017, the FDA approved 23andMe to provide genetic testing for ten diseases. Press
Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer Tests
That Provide Genetic Risk Information for Certain Conditions (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.
fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-allows-marketing-first-direct-consumer-tests-
provide-genetic-risk-information-certain-conditions [https://perma.cc/RJR3-7VXY]. A year lat-
er, the FDA authorized the direct-to-consumer genetic testing for breast cancer. Press Re-
lease, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Authorizes, with Special Controls, Direct-to-Consumer
Test that Reports Three Mutations in the BRCA Breast Cancer Genes (Mar. 6, 2018), https://
www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcedments/fda/authorizes-special-controls-direct-
consumer-test-reports-three-mutations-brca-breast-cancer [https://perma.cc/59S4-QQ8F]. It
is likely that direct-to-consumer genetic testing options will continue to expand.
165. See Robin Williams & Paul Johnson, Inclusiveness, Effectiveness and Intrusiveness:
Issues in the Developing Uses of DNA Profiling in Support of Criminal Investigations, 33 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 545, 556 (2005); Amanda Pattock, Note, It’s All Relative: Familial DNA
Testing and the Fourth Amendment, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 851, 870 (2011).
166. See Erlich et al., supra note 6, at 690. 
167. See Andrew Smart et al., Debate, Health and Genetic Ancestry Testing: Time to Bridge
the Gap, 10 BMC MED. GENOMICS, Jan. 9, 2017, at 1.
168. See id. at 3 (discussing various studies connecting haplogroups to specific diseases).
169. See id.
170. See id.
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information. Therefore, DNA information satisfies the threshold
inquiry even if a person seeks only to obtain ancestry information.171
Genetic information should also fit within the concept of medical
information because of the potential future medical uses of DNA.
While DNA presently can determine predisposition for disease, the
information contained with a genetic profile is likely to become more
accessible as technology progresses.172 Scientists only began to un-
derstand genetic connections to disease a half century ago.173 Today,
genetic testing is available for over two thousand conditions.174
There is no reason to doubt that scientists’ understanding of DNA
will continue to grow.175 The increasingly expansive nature of DNA
requires the adoption of a rule that is future-proof.176 Just as the
Carpenter Court considered the increasing accuracy of CSLI and
GPS technology when holding that individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in CSLI, a court evaluating privacy interests
in DNA should consider the rapidly changing capabilities of DNA
analysis.177 Such scrutiny would likely result in a finding that an in-
dividual should possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in DNA,
whether it is medical information or not.
The federal government has recognized a right to privacy in med-
ical and genetic information through legislation.178 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has also found fundamental rights to privacy related
171. Even if ancestry information is not a medical record, an individual may still possess
a reasonable expectation of privacy in it sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment. See
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (detailing how
the search in Jones provided police access to a person’s “familial, political, professional, reli-
gious, and sexual associations”). Ancestry information could fall within Justice Sotomayor’s
concern about intimate familial information.
172. See BUTLER, supra note 162, at 115 (discussing the rapid growth of DNA technologies).
173. Asude Alpman Durmaz et al., Evolution of Genetic Techniques: Past, Present, and
Beyond, BIOMED RES. INT’L, 2015, at 2.
174. See id. at 1. 
175. See id. at 5.
176. Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
177. See id.
178. When Congress passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, it included
“[g]enetic information” within the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996’s definition of “health information.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9(a)(1) (2012); see also Natalie
Ram, Genetic Privacy After Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265827 [https://perma.cc/U6E4-JYJQ].
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to medical treatment and decisions.179 While these rights have not
been extended to medical information, the information exchanged
between a doctor and patient in the process of making such a med-
ical decision may be covered within the Court’s understanding of
privacy.
Further, the Court has recognized—both implicitly and explicit-
ly—an expectation of privacy in confidential information and com-
munications.180 In Miller, the Court noted that Miller’s checks were
“not confidential communications.”181 The Court suggested that had
Miller’s checks been confidential, he may have had an expectation
of privacy in them.182 Further, common law and many state rules of
evidence recognize a privacy privilege or a physician-patient priv-
ilege.183 While there are some exceptions to this privilege (that is,
fraud or other criminal acts), the privacy interest generally extends
to all communications made for the purposes of treatment or di-
agnosis.184 It is likely that individuals have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their health information, and by extension their DNA.
Finally, DNA information may be subject to heightened privacy
standards due to evolving societal expectations surrounding data
privacy. Some federal courts have recognized a constitutional right
to information privacy since 1980.185 Building on current accepted
privacy standards, Professor Natalie Ram argues that “genetic data
is sensitive, personal, and largely private.”186 She further asserts
that the privacy policies of 23andMe and AncestryDNA support the
fact that individuals have an expectation of privacy in DNA in-
formation shared with these companies.187 Ram’s viewpoint gains
179. Under its substantive due process jurisprudence, the Court has recognized a wide va-
riety of privacy rights that implicate medical treatment or decisions. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (right to refuse life sustaining treatment); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (right to choose whether or not to have an abortion);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (right to access contraception).
180. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. 2 FED. EVID. PRACT. GUIDE § 10.07 (2019). 
184. See id.
185. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980); see
also Behar v. Pa. Dept. of Transp., 791 F. Supp. 2d 383, 393 (M.D. Pa. 2011).
186. Ram, supra note 178, at 26.
187. Id. at 50-54. Ram contrasts the privacy policies of 23andMe and AncestryDNA with
GEDmatch and FamilyTreeDNA. Id. at 50-68. Ram states that “[w]hile 23andMe and
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support from the five concurring and dissenting Justices in Jones,
who noted the evolving societal expectations of privacy surrounding
GPS location tracking.188 Almost everyone carries a GPS tracker in
their cell phone or has GPS in their car.189 At the same time, GPS
tracking continues to increase in accuracy—allowing an analyst to
glean more information about a person’s location than he could pre-
viously.190 Mirroring this enhanced accuracy, society’s expectation
of privacy in location information has increased.191
In the same way, as more and more individuals contribute their
DNA information to third-party databases, analysts can gather sub-
stantial amounts of information about an individual.192 The
potential scope of intimate information that an analyst or the gov-
ernment could recover from a DNA profile is substantially greater
than that contained within location information.193 As scientific
understanding of genetics grows, a previously obtained DNA sample
can provide more and more information about the individual.194
Therefore, with improving technology, society’s expectation of pri-
vacy in DNA information will likewise increase.
B. Involuntary Transfer of DNA
Like CSLI, DNA profiles contained within third-party databases
would implicate an individual whether or not that individual him-
self conveyed the information to a third party.195 Familial DNA
searches allow police to obtain a partial, familial match to a DNA
sample.196 The third-party doctrine assumes that the individual
AncestryDNA take pains to emphasize their commitment to user genetic privacy, particularly
vis-a-vis the government, GEDmatch has taken quite the opposite approach.” Id. at 55.
188. See 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (joined by Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Kagan); id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
189. See Adam Cohen, What Your Cell Phone Could Be Telling the Government, TIME
(Sept. 15, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2019239,00.html [https://
perma.cc/8WNS-5NA4]; Mobile Fact Sheet, supra note 127.
190. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218-19 (2018).
191. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).
192. See Durmaz et al., supra note 173, at 3.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See Erlich et al., supra note 6, at 690.
196. See Greely et al., supra note 21, at 250.
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voluntarily provides information to a third party.197 However, if
there is no “voluntary exposure,” then the rationale for the third-
party doctrine disappears.198 While a DNA profile in a third-party
database may not be “indispensable to participation in modern so-
ciety,” for many Americans, “there is no way to avoid” sharing DNA
information with a third-party database.199 It is difficult to say, look-
ing at the increasing likelihood that DNA information connected to
an individual will soon exist within a third-party database regard-
less of any action taken by that individual,200 that any given person
has “assumed the risk.”201
Even if an individual does voluntarily give over his DNA to a
third party, it is unlikely that he understands the scope of the in-
formation he is sharing. The Court in Miller stated that even if an
individual only reveals information “for a limited purpose” and in
confidence, the Fourth Amendment does not preclude the govern-
ment from obtaining that information.202 However, in Carpenter, the
Court considered that even though an individual may be aware that
he is sharing his location information with his cell phone company,
the scope of that sharing was beyond his control.203 The Carpenter
Court noted that the government’s access to CSLI to track a person’s
location vastly increased its traditional surveillance ability.204 The
government, in effect, would have “absolute surveillance” capabil-
ities.205
Similarly, the expansive, invasive nature of DNA information,
even when voluntarily and knowingly provided to a third party,
presents an incredible increase in the government’s capabilities.
Currently, law enforcement must collect and analyze a DNA sample
before they can compare it to their suspect’s profile.206 Suspect pools
197. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976).
198. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
199. See id.; Erlich et al., supra note 6, at 690 (finding that the majority of white Americans
currently have a third cousin DNA match in a third-party DNA database).
200. See Erlich et al., supra note 6, at 690.
201. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220; Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
202. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
203. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216-17.
204. Id. at 2218.
205. Id.
206. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 18, at 13-16.
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are limited to law-enforcement-maintained databases, such as
CODIS, or DNA samples collected during an investigation.207 With
access to a third-party DNA database, police can search vast cross-
sections of the population’s DNA.208 “Only the few without” a third
cousin or closer relative who has submitted DNA to a third-party
database “could escape this tireless and absolute” search.209
C. Sufficient Safeguards and Comparable Limitations
Allowing the third-party doctrine to control DNA profiles held by
third-party companies implicates the same concerns regarding the
revealing nature of CSLI expressed in Carpenter. When collecting
a DNA profile used for genealogical or medical testing purposes,
there is no way for police to limit their inquiry to the particular in-
formation sought.210 DNA profiles used for these purposes go beyond
the “identifying information” in Smith.211 Commercial companies
test for about 600,000 variations of individual DNA letters.212 Law
enforcement utilizing DNA for identification purposes generally only
analyze thirteen STRs.213 A commercially tested DNA profile,
therefore, contains significantly more information—allowing law en-
forcement officials to connect a DNA profile to more distant rela-
tives.214 Likewise, police could gain a vast amount of an individual’s
medical information215—going far beyond identification purposes
that usually support DNA collection.216 Police are unable to dis-
criminate between “instruments ... used in commercial transactions”
and “confidential communications” that inform medical or familial
207. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
209. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218; see also Erlich et al., supra note 6, at 690 (finding
that 60 percent of Americans of European descent have a third cousin DNA match in a third-
party database).
210. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text. 
211. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742
(1979)). 
212. Saey, supra note 10. 
213. Pattock, supra note 165, at 856.
214. See Saey, supra note 10.
215. See Durmaz et al., supra note 173, at 5.
216. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 450-51 (2013).
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decision-making.217 The same concerns underlying the Carpenter
decision about CSLI—evolving expectations of privacy, involuntary
transfer, and a lack of sufficient safeguards—apply equally to
DNA.218 Courts should therefore find that DNA profiles held by
third-party companies should likewise be subject to the warrant
requirement.
IV. STANDING TO CHALLENGE FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHES OF 
THIRD-PARTY DATABASES
Police tracked Joseph James DeAngelo through a familial DNA
match.219 If law enforcement found an exact match to an individual’s
DNA, that individual could certainly challenge the constitutionality
of the police’s search.220 But what about a search of familial DNA
that implicates an individual? Generally, a person cannot challenge
a search that intrudes on another’s expectation of privacy.221 Recall
that in Rawlings v. Kentucky, the defendant could not challenge the
search of his companion’s purse because—despite owning the con-
tents of the purse—he did not have an expectation of privacy in the
purse itself.222
Genetic information, however, differs drastically from physical
property. DNA information is interconnected between family
members.223 Because a person inherits their DNA from their par-
ents, it is impossible to fully separate a parent’s DNA from his
children’s DNA or two biological siblings’ DNA from one another.224
The closer the familial relationship between two individuals, the
more similar their DNA profiles are.225 Therefore, even if police
conducted a search on a family member’s DNA, that DNA profile is
217. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (quoting United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
218. See id. at 2217-20.
219. Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1.
220. Courts allow defendants to challenge collection and analysis of their own DNA. See,
e.g., King, 569 U.S. at 465 (finding that police procedure to take a cheek DNA swab for
identification purposes is reasonable).
221. See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
222. See 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980).
223. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
224. See Greely et al., supra note 21, at 250.
225. See id.
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more connected to the individual than it would be to another ran-
domly selected person.226
In this way, a DNA profile is more analogous to jointly held prop-
erty. Generally, residents of a home,227 tenants,228 and even hotel
room occupants229 have standing to challenge a search. As long as an
individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy, he will have
standing.230 Additionally, according to five Justices in Minnesota v.
Carter, practically all house guests have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in their host’s home.231 Almost any connection to the home
would be sufficient for Justice Kennedy.232 A guest, invited into a
home for any purpose, could challenge a search under Justice
Ginsburg’s analysis.233 By this reasoning, a homeowner’s newest ac-
quaintance or repeat drug dealer would have standing to challenge
a constitutional violation.234 This is a relatively expansive under-
standing of the expectation of privacy.
By contrast, a defendant challenging a familial DNA match would
have a closer relationship to the individual who “owns” the searched
DNA than any house guest would have with the host. Relatives can
share up to half of their DNA with each other.235 An individual’s
expectation of privacy in half of his DNA is more substantial than
his expectation of privacy to his hotel room or the home of his ac-
quaintance. This expectation of privacy in his familial DNA should,
226. See id.
227. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 330 S.E.2d 364, 367 (Ga. 1985) (finding that defendant had
standing to challenge the search of his room at his grandmother’s house).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 797 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding tenant’s
possessory interest in property sufficient for standing).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Domenech, 623 F.3d 325, 331 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that
defendant had standing to challenge search of hotel room he rented).
230. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 148-49 (1978).
231. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
232. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99-103 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating
that while defendants “established nothing more than a fleeting and insubstantial connection
[to their host’s] home ... as a general rule, social guests will have an expectation of privacy in
their host’s home”).
233. See id. at 106 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen a homeowner ... personally invites
a guest into her home [for any purpose], that guest should share his host’s shelter against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.”).
234. See id.
235. See Greely et al., supra note 21, at 250. This number excludes identical twins, who
share 100 percent of their DNA with one another. Id.
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therefore, be sufficient for standing to challenge a search of it in a
third-party database.
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS
The two chief arguments against standing to challenge familial
DNA searches in third-party databases come from both sides. On
the one hand, some argue that an individual has no privacy interest
in another’s DNA profile, and therefore should not be able to chal-
lenge a warrantless search of that profile. Others argue for a more
expansive view of standing—that an individual should have stand-
ing to challenge any warrantless familial DNA search, including one
of a police database.
A. A Person Has No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in a
Family Member’s DNA
Scholar Amanda Pattock argues that the benefits of familial DNA
testing to society outweigh the intrusion to an individual’s priva-
cy.236 Law enforcement officials, Pattock suggests, have strong in-
terests in identifying suspects, deterring crime, and more efficiently
utilizing resources.237 Individuals’ interests include limiting expo-
sure of familial secrets or otherwise embarrassing information and
protection from overly intrusive law enforcement officials.238
In finding that the interests of society outweigh individuals’
privacy interests, Pattock minimizes the individual’s substantial
privacy interests. However, as this Note details, an individual has
numerous and considerable privacy interests in his genetic informa-
tion.239 Law enforcement officials certainly have interests in effi-
ciently solving crimes and maintaining confidence in the criminal
justice system.240 But, even when engaging in a balancing test,
efficiency and other policy concerns cannot support law enforcement
intrusion into recognized and reasonable privacy interests of
236. Pattock, supra note 165, at 871.
237. Id. at 867-68.
238. Id. at 870-71.
239. See supra Part III.A.
240. Pattock, supra note 165, at 867-68.
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individuals. This is exactly the concern underpinning the Court’s
reasonable expectation of privacy jurisprudence, and ultimately, the
type of government intrusion that the Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect against.241 Thus Pattock’s argument fails to
stand because it does not give adequate weight to an individual’s
privacy interest in genetic information.
B. An Individual Has Standing to Challenge Any Familial DNA
Search
Scholar Lina Alexandra Hogan argues that the “expanded use of
[law enforcement-managed DNA databases] to include familial
searches is a serious intrusion into family members’ expectations of
privacy.”242 In arguing that a family member should have standing
to challenge any familial search of a police (as opposed to a third-
party) DNA database, Hogan concludes that a family member’s pri-
vacy interests outweigh the government’s interests, thereby making
a familial DNA search unreasonable.243 This Note agrees with
Hogan’s analysis regarding the intimate relationship between fam-
ily members’ DNA.244 As Hogan says, “Genetic information is the
most intimate and private information.”245 Further, it is impossible
to disassociate an individual’s DNA from his family member’s
DNA.246
But this close relationship does not extend an expectation of
privacy to the family member of a person whose DNA is held in a
police database. The distinction between a familial search of police-
controlled DNA and third-party controlled DNA comes down to the
expectation of privacy in the underlying DNA sample. This Note
previously determined that a person should have an expectation of
privacy in his genetic profile held by a third party.247 Most individu-
als who provide DNA to a third-party company do so for medical
241. Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018).
242. Lina Alexandra Hogan, Note, Guilt by Relation: If Your Brother Is Convicted of a
Crime, You Too May Do Time, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 543, 586 (2008).
243. See id. at 584-85.
244. See supra Part IV.
245. Hogan, supra note 242, at 579; see also supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
246. See Hogan, supra note 242, at 571-74.
247. See supra Part III.
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testing or ancestry determinations.248 Society has long recognized
special protections and privacy expectations in confidential medical
information.249
In contrast, there is no similar privacy interest in a law enforce-
ment database.250 The Supreme Court concluded that an individual
has a diminished expectation of privacy when in police custody.251
This lowered expectation of privacy allows police to swab an ar-
restee’s mouth for DNA without violating the Fourth Amendment.252
Further, the Court has repeatedly suggested that a person’s ex-
pectation of privacy is less when it concerns only identification
information.253 Unlike DNA that an individual turns over to a third-
party company, there is likely little expectation of privacy to DNA
collected by police for identification.
There is an additional component separating familial searches of
police DNA databases from familial searches of third-party DNA
databases—individuals are often aware of even distant family
members’ arrests. This is especially true for violent or serious
crimes, when police can take DNA at the time of arrest.254 By con-
trast, a person may not know that an immediate family member
sent a DNA sample to a company for medical testing or ancestry
analysis. People often keep medical diagnostics and information
private from those closest to them.255 Considering this, it is unrea-
sonable to suggest that a third cousin would be aware that his
relative had given DNA to a third-party company. The level of notice
for family members of convicts and arrestees further distinguishes
police-held DNA databases from third-party DNA databases. Due
to the lack of underlying privacy interest, coupled with notice, an
individual would have little foundation to support an expectation
248. See supra Part III.A.
249. See supra Part III.
250. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 463 (2013).
251. See id.
252. Id. at 463-64.
253. See id. at 461 (“[T]he Court must give great weight ... to the significant government
interest [in identification of arrestees through DNA].”); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727
(1969) (suggesting that “under narrowly defined circumstances,” fingerprinting for identi-
fication may comply with the Fourth Amendment).
254. See King, 569 U.S. at 447-48.
255. See supra Part III.A.
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of privacy argument sufficient for standing to challenge a police-
maintained DNA database.
CONCLUSION
Familial DNA searches of third-party databases present un-
charted territory for courts. If police continue to utilize results of
these searches in criminal investigations, Fourth Amendment chal-
lenges will come. These future challenges to DNA searches of third-
party databases will not be alone—they will join a myriad of other
issues, such as warrantless collection of CSLI, confronting courts as
technology strains former understandings of the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.
Traditional understandings of both expectations of privacy and
standing would preclude challenges to familial searches of DNA
held by third parties.256 However, as evidenced in part by the
Court’s decision in Carpenter, society’s expectations of privacy are
evolving.257 Genetic information implicates data privacy, medical
information, and confidentiality concerns.258 Due to the unique,
interconnected, and sensitive nature of DNA, an individual has a
heightened and sufficient expectation of privacy.259 Therefore, law
enforcement must obtain a warrant before accessing DNA held by
a third party.260 This same expectation of privacy extends to family
members who are unable to disconnect their DNA from their family
members’ DNA in third-party databases.261 Allowing a company to
analyze one’s DNA for medical or ancestry purposes does not do
away with the protection all Americans have to be free from un-
reasonable and unwarranted government intrusion.
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